The HS2 story is dire. According to one calculation, estimated costs to complete Phase 1 rose 134% in real terms over the 10 years 2012-2022 with the estimate in current prices in the region of £67bn (Financial Times 10/01/24). This rampant budget escalation provided the political justification for cancelling of what remained from Phase 2 of the programme. While this decision is understandable politically, it has left HS2 as a massive £50bn+ investment with a negative ratio of benefits to costs and the prospect of poorer connectivity than now with London for those living north of Birmingham.
This Insights Paper investigates how HS2 got into this mess, with the goal of learning the lessons and ensuring that they are never repeated. The analysis draws on a review of published sources – especially National Audit Office Value for Money Reports – and attendance at a Westminster Forum conference in November 2023, shortly after the announcement of the cancellation. The initial conclusions of this analysis were presented at Chief Executive Officer’s dinner, at which leading players in HS2 over the last 20 years were present, organised by the Major Projects Association under Chatham House rules in January 2024.
Author Graham Winch
